My aim in this chapter is not to take issue with the presence of these posited goods. 14 No one doubts that some children will be made better off by preserving a connection with a de facto parent. 15 But this gain may not be as great as we might think it would be by extrapolating from biological parents. New, carefully constructed studies of parental investment suggest that the level of investments that fathers make in children varies with the fathers' biological relatedness to the child. 16 Moreover, whatever the magnitude of the gain for some children, it comes at a cost. A significant body of research suggests that giving men previously in relationships with a child's mother significant amounts of unsupervised parental access -as the ALI proposes to do -will result in more children being sexually exploited and physically abused. 17 This chapter argues that before we grant Ex Live-In Partners new parental "rights," we must do more than simply posit good outcomes. Rather, policymakers, courts, and legislators should sum these probable effects, good and bad, to evaluate whether the approach is, on balance, a net good. Before any decisionmaker implements the ALI's proposed treatment of Ex Live-In Partners, they should be convinced that the ALI has met its burden of demonstrating that this creation and enlargement of parental rights would benefit children more than it would harm them. As Professor Eekelaar concludes so aptly with respect to the past caretaking standard, "But if it is to be presumed that an arrangement will be in a child's best interests, it must be clear that this will be so in an overwhelming majority of cases. In the absence of clear evidence that time matching will satisfy this, or even that this is what parents usually do by agreement, it fails as a presumption." 18 In working out this calculus, this chapter discusses only one risk to children from conferring significantly expanded parent-like "rights" on Ex Live-In Partners: the possibility of sexual exploitation. This chapter focuses only on sexual abuse because it is sufficient to illustrate one probable harm some children will likely experience if we follow the ALI's recommendations. But sexual exploitation is by no means the only harm to which we would expose children by instituting a free-form, fluid conception of parenthood that encompasses every cohabitant with whom a woman shared equal caretaking responsibility for two years or more. Some of these children are likely also to experience punishing physical abuse and neglect.
19 § 2.03 cmt. b(ii), at 111-12. The legal recognition of parents by estoppel is justified in part by expectations of the parties. Principles § 2.03 cmt. b(ii), at 112 ("When this reasonable good faith [that the individual is the parent] exists, the individual is seeking status based not solely on his functioning as a parent but on the combination of the parental functions performed and the expectations of the parties."). Legal recognition is also predicated on actions that are sufficiently clear and unambiguous to indicate parental status was contemplated by all. Principles § 2.03 cmt. b(iii), at 114. Parents by estoppel will often have lived with the child since birth and believed themselves to be the child's biological parent. Principles § 2.03 (1)(b)(ii),(iii); Seger v. Seger, 542 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (granting partial custody and visitation to stepfather who lived with child's mother for two years when she informed him she was pregnant with his child and who raised and supported the child after she revealed he was not the father, until the couple's break up). This is important from a risk assessment perspective and possibly also to the benefits we would predict to children of continuing contact. See Parts II & III infra. Consequently, the recommendations and critiques in this chapter are limited to the ALI's proposed treatment of de facto parents. 14 The drafters assume that Ex Live-In Partners who performed caretaking tasks for a child have done so for benign reasons, not malign ones. As note 45 infra observes, the drafters confine their consideration of child abuse to abuse that "has occurred," neglecting the potential for future abuse. 15 There is certainly no dearth of social science evidence suggesting some children will indeed benefit from continuing contact. See infra note 80. 16 See infra Part II. 17 See infra Part III. 18 Eekelaar, this volume. 19 Children living with unrelated males are more vulnerable to physical abuse and other forms of child abuse. For instance, British children living with their mother and a cohabitant are 33 times more likely to be physically abused Because this argument hinges on the calculation of probable harms or goods resulting to children who have lived with a stepfather or the mother's unmarried live-in partner, it is necessarily limited. The research presented here sheds light only on the wisdom of giving to Ex Live-In Partners parent-like "rights" of access to children, without the moderating influence of a mother's presence. It cannot tell us anything at all about whether women in now-defunct relationships with a child's father should receive custody and visitation "rights," nor can it help us to evaluate whether to extend such rights to lesbian coparents. Both questions would involve a different set of calculations than presented here. 20 This chapter evaluates whether the drafters' ballooning definition of parent has the potential for ill, as well as for good. Part I describes and critiques the ALI's proposed treatment of de facto parents. Part II reviews new studies that suggest that the upside to children of continuing contact with an Ex Live-In Partner may be more muted than the ALI assumes. Part III then provides a primer on factors affecting a child's risk of sexual abuse, and concludes that in this brave new world of newly anointed "parents," protective factors that might serve to shield a child from sexual victimization are not marshaled on behalf of the child. Part IV then examines the way in which sexual predators "groom" their victims and documents the significant overlap between "grooming" and the caretaking functions used to decide who qualifies as a de facto parent. Part V asks whether the test for de facto parents can be refined to select for "good risks," while culling out the bad and argues that an individualized decision based on the nature of the child's attachment to the Ex Live-In Partner would better promote the welfare of the children involved. Part VI concludes that the ALI -and more importantly, legislatures and courts that consider these proposalsshould not base such sweeping changes in parental rights on unsupported assumptions and 73 times more likely to be killed than children living in an intact family. See Robert Whelan, Broken Homes and Battered Children: A Study of the Relationship Between Child Abuse and Family Type, tbls.12 & 14 (1994) (reporting a risk of physical abuse for children living with two natural married parents of 0.23, compared to a risk of 7.65 for children living with their natural mother and a cohabitee and a risk of fatal abuse for children living with both natural, married parents of 0.31, compared to a risk of fatal abuse of 22.9 for children living with their natural mother and a cohabitee). A child in a stepparent household is 120 times more likely to be bludgeoned to death than a child living with his genetic father in an intact household. Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1117 Rev. , 1208 Rev. (1997 . New research focusing on all forms of child maltreatment has found that " [c] hildren who had a father surrogate living in the home were twice as likely to be reported for maltreatment after his entry into the home than those with either a biological father (odds ratio = 2.6, 95% confidence interval = 1.4-4.7) or no father figure in the home (odds ratio = 2.0, 95% confidence interval = 1.1-3. Similarly, Ania Wilczynski reports in an English sample of child-killing that the "proportion of male parentsubstitutes and male cohabitees [among child killers] were nine and fifty times" their respective rates in a national survey. Ania Wilczynski, Child Homicide 72-73 (1997) . In an Australian sample, she found that nonbiological parents comprised 27 percent of the child-killers, although "only an estimated 7 percent of Australian children . . . lived in step or blended families." Id. 20 This is so because we know very little about child sexual abuse by women, other than it seems to occur very rarely.
See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse: Evaluating the Danger Posed by a Sexually Predatory Parent to the
Victim's Siblings, 51 Emory L. J. 241, 245 n.13 (2002) . Moreover, the principal risk to children of punishing physical abuse comes from father substitutes rather than from women. See Part III infra. It is worth noting, however, that an important impetus for permitting parental claims by de facto parents and parents by estoppel was to recognize same sex partners who cannot adopt one another's child or marry their partners. This desire to recognize same sex partners may have led to a number of unintended consequences and tensions explored here. To protect a mother's right to decide who has contact with her child without undermining the recognition many would like to extend to same-sex, non-biological parents may be tricky. Part V suggests that state legislators may want to address only the most compelling cases for significantly expanding rights for nonbiological caretakers -like the interests of same sex partners or of stepfathers who want to care for a child after the mother's death -and leave the less compelling cases untouched.
I. The ALI Views Continuing Contact between Children and Ex Live-In Partners as an Unadulterated Good
This part demonstrates that the drafters view continuing contact between children and men who shared caretaking with a child's mother for two years or more -whether married or unmarried -as an unadulterated good. It first outlines the substantive and standing rights the ALI seeks to confer upon an Ex Live-In Partner, and then critiques this treatment of de facto parents.
A. ALI's Treatment of De Facto Parents
As noted earlier, the drafters want to ensure continuing contact between a child and former partner of the child's parent, without -they argue -"unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion into the relationships between legal parents and their children." 21 To accomplish this, their test for status as a de facto parent is, they urge, "strict:"
22
(1) The individual must have lived with the child for a significant period of time (not less than two years), and acted in the role of a parent for reasons primarily other than financial compensation [described hereinafter as the "Residency Requirement"]. (2) The legal parent or parents must have agreed to the arrangement, or it must have arisen because of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions [described hereinafter as the "Agreement Requirement"]. (3) In addition, the individual must have functioned as a parent either by (a) having performed the majority share of caretaking functions for the child, or (b) having performed a share of caretaking functions that is equal to or greater than the share assumed by the legal parent with whom the child primarily lives [described hereinafter as the "Caretaking Requirement"].
23
Significantly, there is no requirement that treatment as a de facto parent be in the best interests of the child, as is required for certain parents by estoppel.
24
The Residency Requirement functions to exclude "neighbors, nonresidential relatives, or hired babysitters," 25 while the exclusion of relationships motivated by money is designed to cull out caretakers who are not "motivated by love and loyalty." 26 Although the drafters seek to recognize "long-term, substitute parent-child relationship[s]," coresidence for as little as two years may qualify an adult as a de facto parent. 27 The length of time that is considered "significant" will vary with the child's age, frequency of contact with the adult, and the intensity of their relationship. 28 For children under six, two years "is likely to qualify as significant" while longer periods "may be required" for school-aged children, and "even longer" if the child is an adolescent. Although the Agreement Requirement requires "an affirmative act or acts by the legal parent demonstrating a willingness and an expectation of shared parental responsibilities," agreement may be implied by the circumstances. 34 When two adults share roughly equal responsibility for a child, this equal caretaking by itself satisfies the agreement requirement. Consider illustration 22:
For the past four years, seven-year-old Lindsay has lived with her mother, Annis, and her stepfather, Ralph. During that period, Ralph and Annis both worked outside the home, and divided responsibility for Lindsay's care roughly equally between them.
Annis's sharing of responsibility for Lindsay's care with Ralph constitutes an implied agreement by her to the role assumed by Ralph.
35
In short, any parent who acquiesces in her partner's decision to take on equal caretaking duties, would likely "have agreed" to the partner's claim of de facto parent status.
With respect to the Ex Live-In Partner's share of caretaking functions, he must have performed at least as much care as the legal parent herself provided. 36 Caretaking functions consist of the chores necessary for the "direct delivery of day-to-day care and supervision to the child."
37 They include "physical supervision, feeding, grooming, discipline, transportation, direction of the child's intellectual and emotional development, and arrangement of the child's peer activities, medical care, and education." 38 In the drafters' view, caretaking functions "are likely to have a special bearing on the strength and quality of the adult's relationship with the child" because they involve "tasks relating directly to a child's care and upbringing." 39 The Caretaking Requirement is central not only to the de facto parent's qualification qua de facto parent, but also to the allocation of time with the child, which the drafters label "custodial responsibility." 40 Section 2.08 of the Principles generally seeks after the break-up to "approximate" those caretaking arrangements that preceded it. 41 Thus, the than two years may be required in order to establish that an individual has the kind of relationship that warrants recognition." Principles § 2.03 cmt. c (iv), at 122 (emphasis added "approximation" or "past caretaking" standard requires that "the proportion of time the child spends with each parent [approximate] the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents' separation," unless an exception applies. 42 The justification for this arrangement is that "the division of past caretaking functions correlates well with other factors associated with the child's best interests, such as the quality of each parent's emotional attachment to the child and the parents' respective parenting abilities." 43 The rights of access that the Principles would give to Ex Live-In Partners appear to include unsupervised visitation and overnight stays. Supervised visits are reserved for those instances when protecting the child or the child's parent is warranted, as when the courts finds "credible evidence of domestic violence." 44 As Professor Levy notes in this volume, exceptions for departing from the past caretaking standard are available to protect the child or a parent from the other parent's neglect or abuse, domestic violence, or drug or alcohol abuse;
45 to accommodate an older child's preferences; to protect a child from the harm that would result from the rule's application "because of a gross disparity in the quality of the emotional attachment between each parent and the child or in each parent's demonstrated ability or availability to meet the child's need;" and to avoid allocations that "would be extremely impractical or that would interfere substantially with the child's need for stability . . . ;" among other things. 46 Generally, however, if an Ex Live-In Partner puts in half the work involved in caring for a child, he gets as much as half the time, 47 subject to the practical constraints of splitting time with a child fifty-fifty, as explained more fully below. 42 Principles § 2.08. Section 2.03(5) defines "caretaking functions" as "tasks that involve interaction with the child or that direct, arrange, and supervise the interaction and care provided by others." A nonexclusive list of caretaking functions includes such matters as "satisfying the nutritional needs of the child," "directing the child's various developmental needs," "providing discipline," "supervising chores," "performing other tasks that attend to the child's needs for behavioral control and self-restraint," "arranging for the child's education," "providing moral and ethical guidance," and a host of other specified functions. Id. § 2.03(5)(a)-(h). Section 2.03(3) makes clear that "custodial responsibility" "refers to physical custodianship and supervision of a child. It usually includes, but does not necessarily require, residential or overnight responsibility." Section 2.03(6) defines "parenting functions," a phrase which appears only in Section 2.09(2) (see infra note 50), to include "tasks that serve the needs of the child or the child's residential family," such as "caretaking functions" and a diverse variety of other functions, from "providing economic support," "yard work, and house cleaning," to "participating in decision-making regarding the child's welfare" and "arranging for financial planning." Principles § 2.03(6). 43 48 and then it gives him substantive rights. 49 In terms of substantive rights, the Ex Live-In Partner will have a claim to an equal share of the custodial responsibility for a child, subject to three limits. First, a de facto parent may not receive a majority of the custodial responsibility for a child over the objection of the child's legal parent or parent by estoppel, unless that parent has not been performing a reasonable share of the child's parenting. 50 Second, although a de facto parent can receive some decision-making responsibility for a child, he is not presumptively entitled to this, as a legal parent or parent by estoppel would be. 51 Third, a de facto parent does not get presumptive access to a child's school or health records, as other parents do under the Principles.
52 In addition to these specific limitations, there is the general exception to the past caretaking standard, noted above, that provides that a de facto parent should not receive an allocation of time with the child if making such an award would be impractical.
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To make this more concrete, consider illustration 1 to Section 2.18. There, Barbara marries Randall and for four years acts as the primary caretaker for his two children from a prior marriage. 54 Randall supports the family economically and provides backup care. At divorce, "assuming Barbara satisfies the definition of a de facto parent," she "may be allocated a coequal share of responsibility with Randall," or a "smaller share" if practicality so dictates. 55 However, because Randall has been performing a reasonable share of parenting functions, Barbara will not receive "the majority share of custodial responsibility for the children unless Randall agrees, or unless she shows that an 48 Section 2.04 gives standing and notice rights to a de facto parent who "resided with the child within the six-month period prior to the filing of the action or who has consistently maintained or attempted to maintain the parental relationship since residing with the child." Principles § 2.04 (1)(c), at 134. The six-month window is waived if the de facto parent "consistently maintained or attempted to maintain the parental relationship since no longer sharing the same residence. 57 Although a growing number of jurisdictions already give standing to nonparents, many of these limit standing only to grandparents or stepparents. 58 Very few permit unmarried cohabitants to initiate actions for custody or visitation. 59 Contrast the ALI's proposed reforms with the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which allows an action by "a person other than a parent, . . . but only if [the child] is not in the physical custody of one of his parents." 60 There, an emergency -the absence of legal parentsnecessitates standing by others. Here, we have third parties, unrelated adults, given the opportunity to tread on the parental prerogatives of the legal parent. In the absence of the Principles, an Ex Live-In Partner today would likely receive some limited visitation in certain jurisdictions with the child after the breakup, but nothing that approaches the allocations of time that the ALI proposes to give. As Professor Jane Murphy noted in a recent review of de facto parent cases, a "few states and a handful of courts have granted nonbiological, non-marital caretakers such as stepfathers . . . rights similar to those granted legal fathers," but "these cases generally limit the parental rights to visitation."
61
Like all custody rules, 62 the rights the ALI seeks to create in some jurisdictions and enlarge in others only come into play when the legal parent does not willingly grant visitation to her ex-partner. 63 A mother can always decide voluntarily to provide visitation to those men she thinks will enrich her child's life.
Interestingly, the ALI would extract very little from Ex Live-In Partners in exchange for this significant enlargement of parental rights. As Professor Katharine Baker points out in this volume, the Principles impose child support obligations on parents by estoppel but not on de facto parents. 64 This choice is perplexing since live-in partners benefit children by providing them with additional financial support during the intact adult relationship and presumably could do so to some degree afterwards. 
B. Critique of the ALI's Treatment of De Facto Parents
If state legislatures or courts institute these proposals, many mothers will find themselves unable to excise former lovers from their lives and the lives of their children. This should trouble us. As Professor Karen Czapanskiy observes: "For [the caregiver] to do the job to the best of her or his abilities, [they] need[] authority as well as responsibility. . . . The autonomy of the lead caregiver must be respected." 66 The Agreement Requirement is a weak reed of protection against such a dramatic and unexpected result. A partner's interest in and interaction with her children presumably is a desired goal of most women, and is likely to be warmly received. What mother would not allow her husband or live-in partner to read to her child, help put the child to bed and wake him or her up in the morning, and otherwise share caretaking responsibility? The fact that many of these actions may be undertaken with the legal parent's consent in an ongoing relationship seems to say very little about the legal parent's expectations after the relationship's demise.
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It was unnecessary to stretch the tent of parenthood this far. Many live-in partners who want to protect their interests in an existing adult-child bond after their relationship ends with the child's mother, can adopt the child. 68 Moreover, the drafters' provision of standing to nonparents when it serves the best interests of the child would have accommodated the most compelling claims for standing to seek custody and visitation with a child, 69 without encompassing every Tom, Dick, and Harry with whom a woman cohabits for two years and shares an equal caretaking load.
Despite acknowledging that legal parents exhibit the "maximum commitment to the parenting enterprise," 70 the drafters make no inquiry, when providing standing and an allocation of custodial responsibility, into the reasons for the legal parent's objection. 71 Perhaps she ended the relationship because of his interaction with her child.
72
Other than stock observations about emotions running high at the time of breakup, 73 the drafters have no more reason to believe that when a mother withholds access she does so out of spite or selfishness than they do for believing that she is motivated would promote continuing contact between children and those adults who have committed to a child in concrete, palpable ways -where continuing contact is likely to create the greatest gains for a child -while possibly helping to screen out "bad risks." See Parts II, III and IV infra. 66 Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 957, 979-80, 1029 Rev. 957, 979-80, (1994 . 67 Contrast this with coparents who have set forth an understanding in writing about how a child will be parented, where it may well be the expectation of the parties to share parental responsibilities during the relationship and after. Principles § 2.03 cmt. c (iii), at 121. 68 Principles § 2.03 cmt. c, at 119 (noting that adults can protect their interest in a relationship with a child by adopting the child "if available under applicable state law"). 69 Principles § 2.04(2) (giving the court discretion "in exceptional cases, . . . to grant permission to intervene, under such terms as it establishes, to other individuals . . . whose participation in the proceedings under this Chapter it determines is likely to serve the child's best interests"). 70 Principles ch. 1, Topic 1.I (d), at 5-6. 71 The one exception to this is for past or ongoing abuse, but not mere queasiness that something is not right about a partner's interaction with a child. 72 Diana E. H. Russell, The Secret Trauma: Incest in the Lives of Girls and Women 372 (1986) (reporting that one in four nonoffending mothers suspected the abuse shortly before the child's disclosure). 73 Principles § 2.08 cmt. b, at 183 (observing, in a discussion of the rationale for the past caretaking standard, that the parties' "expectations and preferences are often complicated at divorce by feelings of loss, anxiety, guilt, and anger-feelings that tend not only to cloud a parent's judgment and ability to make decisions on behalf of the child, but also to exaggerate the amount of responsibility a parent wants to assume for a child, or the objections he or she has to the other parent's level of involvement in the child's life"). by concern for the best interests of her child. 74 Moreover, one can easily imagine that the rights the ALI seeks to confer on Ex Live-In Partners could be exploited not as an opportunity to stay in the children's lives, but as an opportunity to control a child or her mother.
Further, conferring new parental rights is not without cost. By granting standing to Ex Live-In Partners, we would encourage the adults involved to resolve problems in court, with all the costs and damaged relationships that result. We would also encourage litigation by conferring substantive rights on Ex Live-In Partners. It may be important to encourage continuing relationships with Ex Live-In Partners, but long, expensive custody fights -even where the mother wins -have financial and emotional costs that hurt her and the child. This is particularly worrisome as a risk because the definition of de facto parent requires such complex fact finding. Nonetheless, the drafters latch onto bright-line, easily verifiable time requirements in an effort to avoid expensive and, in their view, generally counterproductive inquiries into the qualitative nature of the relationship being preserved. Such inquiries are counterproductive both because they "draw[] the court into comparisons between parenting styles and values that are matters of parental autonomy not appropriate for judicial resolution," 75 and because they require expert testimony which, in the "adversarial context, tends to focus on the weaknesses of each parent and thus undermines the spirit of cooperation and compromise necessary to successful post-divorce custodial arrangements." 76 A time test also obscures the underlying "good" for which the time requirement serves as a proxy -the depth and quality of the adult-child relationship. Attachment may well safeguard a child who has contact with that adult after the breakup. 77 Yet it plays no part in the ALI's assessment of who counts as a de facto parent and has standing to seek such rights of access. Neither is attachment explicitly considered in awarding visitation and custody, unless there is a "gross disparity in the quality of the [child's] emotional attachment" with each parent. 78 74 As the Principles observe, "[t]he law grants parents responsibility for their children based, in part, on the assumption that they are motivated by love and loyalty, and thus are likely to act in the child's best interests." Principles § 2.03 cmt. c (ii), at 120. 75 Principles § 2.08 cmt. b, at 181-82 (making this observation about the "best interests" test and arguing that the approximation standard "yields more predictable and more easily adjudicated results, thereby advancing the best interests of children in most cases without infringing on parental autonomy"). 76 Principles § 2.08 cmt. b, at . 77 See infra Part V. 78 See Principles § 2.08(1)(d). 
C. The ALI Fails to Take into Account the Repercussions of Including Ex Live-In Partners in Children's Lives
As noted above, the drafters construct a benign explanation for why an Ex Live-In Partner should have access to the child of their former partner. For the drafters, the impulse is at once selfless and selfish, grounded in a desire to continue an important parent-child relationship. Having largely assumed the possibility of an upside -one half of the calculus shown in Figure 5 .1 -the drafters abruptly conclude that continuing contact between de facto parents and the children of their former lovers is an unqualified good for children.
Missing from this account is a critical, in-depth examination of the degree of gain children are likely to experience from continuing contact with an Ex Live-In Partner after the adults' relationship dissolves. Entirely absent from this account is the possible downside, the second half of the equation shown in Figure 5 .1. 79 While we may expect that some children (perhaps even the overwhelming majority) will be made better off, to some degree, 80 we should also affirmatively expect that others will be made worse off, and profoundly so.
81 This is so because many sex offenders use adult relationships to gain sexual access to children, 82 and the Principles could be employed to give them continuing access to child victims.
The next two parts argue that imbuing adults with parental rights merely because they resided with a child and shared equal caretaking chores may not yield the welfare benefits for children that we might hope for, especially in light of the fact that the rights of continuing contact do not carry a concomitant duty to financially support these children. Equally important, any gains for children will come at a price. The ALI proposal would stretch the "parenthood" tent so wide that it will necessarily encompass some men with less-than-admirable motives or impulses. 79 Although they have not examined the particular set of risks being examined here, scholars generally agree that the "definition of parent should be expanded or curtailed only when doing so serves to further the child's interests." Janet Leach Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental Rights Versus Child Rights, 40 Wayne L. Rev. 1227 Rev. , 1229 Rev. (1994 . 80 For an excellent recitation of the social science evidence that many children will benefit from continuing contact, see Katharine T. [n]ear consensus" exists that a child's healthy growth depends upon the continuing of his personal relationships). See also Holmes, supra note 8, at 389-90 (noting "the current consensus remains that children benefit from continued contact with non-custodial parents"); Kaas, supra note note 79, at 1119 (examining the "psychological harm to the child" that would result from a change in custody in favor of or contrary to a nongenetic caretaker). Other scholars have analyzed the "findings of the recent research on the stepparent relationship," and concluded that "insofar as the needs of children are concerned, economic considerations suggest that remarriage is typically beneficial." Chambers, supra note 8, at 102, 108. The "surge of research on the stepparent relationship," id. at 102-03, is useful in determining whether a child benefits from stepparents who are in an intact relationship with the child's legal parent, but is less helpful in assessing the risks and benefits to a child of continuing contact after the adults break up. 81 See infra note note 178 and accompanying text (noting that abuse inflicted by father substitutes is among the most depraved and injurious). Of course, there are other costs to giving de facto parents parental rights. In her seminal article in the Virginia Law Review, Katharine Bartlett, one of the three drafters of the Principles, concluded that the "key disadvantages of broadening access to parenthood" are the increase in "the number of adults making claim to a child and enhanc [ing] the indeterminacy that already exists in child custody law." Bartlett, supra note 80, at 945. 82 See infra Part III.B. 
II. Evaluating the Upside to Children from Continuing Contact with Ex Live-In Partners
"A limited but growing number of studies examine the social well-being of children living in cohabiting parent families." 83 Two recent, carefully constructed studies continue this work, using very different analytical tools. The first study, by Manning and Lamb, evaluates outcomes for children raised by biological and nonbiological fathers and compares these to outcomes for children raised only by their mothers. 84 The second study, by Hofferth and Anderson, examines differential investments in children by biological and nonbiological fathers. 85 As a pair, these studies provide a valuable lens for assessing the relative importance of biology as a factor affecting children's welfare and the incentive various fathers have to invest in children.
A. The Importance of Biological Ties for Child Well-Being
Manning and Lamb examined the well-being of adolescents in various families and asked (1) whether teenagers who live with their mother and her partner, whether married ("stepfathers") or unmarried ("mother's cohabitant"), do as well academically and behaviorally as teenagers living with two married, biological parents, and (2) whether these children fare better or worse than children living with single mothers. 86 The results of this analysis indicate that children living with a stepfather or mother's cohabitant are more likely than children living with two married, biological parents to be expelled from school, exhibit greater levels of delinquency, and encounter more school problems. 87 Additionally, these children are more likely to have a lower grade point average and generally greater odds of achieving lower grades; they also score lower on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test ("PPVT"). 88 As the authors note, none of this is surprising. Children living in two married, biological parent families "generally fare better than teenagers living in any other family type." 89 What was novel and perhaps even surprising were Manning and Lamb's findings when they shifted the frame of reference from two married, biological parent families to single 83 87 Id. at 885-86 tbl. 3 (using married two parent families as a reference category, and finding that teens who lived with mother's cohabitant were more likely to be expelled from school (.80, p < .001), exhibit greater levels of delinquency (1.32, p < .01), and encounter more school problems (.76, p < .001); while children living with a stepfather were more likely to be expelled from school (.56, p < .001), exhibit greater levels of delinquency (.61, p < .01), and encounter more school problems (.69, p < .001)). 88 Id. (using married two parent families as a reference category, and finding that teens who lived with mother's cohabitant were more likely to receive low grades (.64, p < .001) and have lower vocabulary scores (−2.36, p < .01); while children living with a stepfather were more likely to receive low grades (.52, p < .001), and have lower vocabulary scores although the difference was not statistically significant 
mother families. There they found that children living with stepfathers or mother's cohabitants "have similar odds of being suspended or expelled as their counterparts living in single-mother families." 90 Teens living with stepfathers had "lower levels of delinquency than teens living with single mothers," while teens living with mother's cohabitant experienced more delinquency, although the difference receded when other variables were taken into account. 91 Teens in all three households experience similar levels of trouble in school and possessed similar verbal skills and college expectations.
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Although they found "differences at the bivariate level . . . in terms of delinquency and low grades in school" between teens living with single mothers and those living with stepfathers, Manning and Lamb concluded that "teenagers living with unmarried mothers do not seem to benefit from the presence of their mother's cohabiting partner."
93 Consequently:
[M]en's presence alone seems neither sufficient nor necessary to create positive outcomes for children. Indeed, our results show that stepfathers (married or cohabiting) provide limited benefit when contrasted with single-mother families. Our findings suggest that neither parental cohabitation nor marriage to a partner or spouse who is not related to the child (stepfamily formation) is associated with uniform advantage in terms of behavioral or academic indicators to teenagers living in single-mother families.
94
Manning and Lamb note that their "results are consistent with research focusing on behavior problems."
95

B. The Importance of Biological Ties for Paternal Investments
Studies of outcomes for children by family type suffer from an obvious limitation: a poorer outcome may be due to family form, but it may also be the result of other factors. For instance, differences in outcomes for children in two biological parent, married families versus those in cohabiting families may be attributable to a host of differences between these families, including income, relative youth of the parents, higher levels of stress and conflict, 96 role confusion, or a lack of clear expectations about parenting in cohabiting households. 97 Unlike outcome studies, a focus on investment avoids the multitude of reasons why groups of children may fare better or worse than others on average. 98 90 Id. at 886-87 & tbl.4 (using single mother households as a reference category, and finding that teens who lived with mother's cohabitant had similar odds of being expelled or suspended, whether in the bivariate model or the multivariate model)were more likely to be expelled from school (.80, p < .001), exhibit greater levels of delinquency (1.32, p < .01), and encounter more school problems (.76, p < .001); while children living with a stepfather were more likely to be expelled from school (.56, p < .001), exhibit greater levels of delinquency (.61, p < .01), and encounter more school problems (.69, p < .001) 
Hofferth and Anderson examined levels of residential father involvement, comparing children living with biological fathers to children living with nonbiological fathers (stepfathers and mother's cohabitants).
99 They compared investments in children by married, biological fathers, stepfathers (married but nonbiological parents), and mother's cohabitant family (unmarried, nonbiological parents), all of whom resided with the child. 100 Hofferth and Anderson measured "parental involvement" in terms of time children spent actively engaged with their father; 101 weekly hours when the father was available to the child but not actively engaged with the child; 102 number of activities the father participated in with the child in the past month;
103 and "warmth" toward the child, as reported by fathers themselves. 104 Hofferth and Anderson conclude that the investments fathers make in their children are significantly influenced by biological-relatedness. 105 They confirmed, as initially hypothesized, that children spent significantly more time actively engaged with a married, biological father than with a nonbiological father, whether a stepfather or mother's cohabitant. Specifically, married biological fathers spent 15.63 hours per week engaged with their child, compared to 9.15 hours for stepfathers and 10.10 for mother's cohabitants. 106 Hours available fell off for stepfathers when compared to married biological fathers, but increased for mother's cohabitants: 13.35 hours per week for married biological fathers, 10.94 hours for stepfathers and 17.24 for mother's cohabitants. 107 With regard to activities, children did significantly fewer activities with nonbiological fathers, whether stepfathers or mother's cohabitants. Married biological fathers engaged in 9.13 activities with their biological child over the course of a month, while stepfathers engaged in 8.22 activities and mother's cohabitants engaged in 7.43 activities.
108 Finally, with regard to warmth, biology correlated positively with fathers' own assessment of the warmth they felt toward the children with 99 Hofferth & Anderson, supra note 85, at 223. 100 Id. at 218-19. Hofferth and Anderson used data from the 1997 Child Development Supplement to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, a 30-year longitudinal survey of a representative sample of United States men, women, children, and the families with whom they resided. The study sample represented 2,522 children who were reported by the primary caregiver to be living with an adult male, "either their biological father, a stepfather who is a nonbiological father married to the mother, or their mother's cohabiting partner." id. at 219. 101 Id. This figure was obtained using a time diary of the child's activities, as reported by the child and/or the child's mother, including the question "[w]ho was doing the activity with [the] child?" The diary captured one weekday and one weekend day. Figures for the weekday (multiplied by five) were added to the figure for the weekend day (multiplied by two) to arrive at a weekly figure. Id. at 220. 102 Hofferth & Anderson, supra note 85, at 219. This was also accomplished using the time diary, with the additional question, "[w]ho else was there but not directly involved in the activity?" Id. 103 Id. at 220. The researchers analyzed thirteen activities: "going to the store; washing or folding clothes; doing dishes; cleaning house; preparing food; looking at books or reading stories; doing arts and crafts; talking about the family; working on homework; building or repairing something; playing computer or video games; playing a board game, card game, or puzzle; and playing sports or outdoor activities." These questions were only asked with respect to children three years and older, with the result that the sample sizes are lowest for this variable. Id. 104 Id. The study measured warmth by the father's responses to six items: "how often in the past month the father hugged each child, expressed his love, spent time with child, joked or played with child, talked with child, and told child he appreciated what he or she did." Id. 105 Id. at 213 ("Biology explains less of father involvement than anticipated once differences between fathers are controlled."). 106 Id. at 223. Both findings were significant at a high level of confidence, with p < .001. 107 Id. at 223 & tbl.3 (reporting significance levels for the stepfather finding of p < .05 and for the finding with respect to mother's cohabitants p < .001). Hofferth and Anderson surmised that these differences exist between biological and stepfathers because stepchildren may be receiving some or all of that time and attention from a nonresidential biological father, which "makes up for part of the shortfall with residential stepfathers." Id. at 223. 108 Id. at 224 & tbl.3. Both findings were significant at a high level of confidence, with p < .05. Clearly, married biological fathers may be investing in their children more heavily than nonbiological fathers for reasons that have nothing to do with biology, but reflect instead wealth, educational levels, or other sociodemographic differences between these groups of men. 110 To evaluate whether these sociodemographic differences accounted for the differences in investment, Hofferth and Anderson controlled for race, father's age, child's gender and age, number of children, percentage of months lived with the father, father's work hours per week and earnings, and whether the father paid child support for children outside the house. 111 The increased investment in biological children persisted after controlling for socioeconomic factors. Specifically, nonbiological fathers spent over five hours less a week on average with their children than married biological fathers. 112 Differences persisted for the second factor (hours available) only for stepfathers, who were available to the children 4.63 fewer hours than married biological fathers, 113 while stepfathers and mother's cohabitants performed significantly fewer activities with a child than married, biological fathers, 4.35 fewer and 5.79 fewer, respectively. 114 When it came to warmth, significant differences emerged for mother's cohabitants but not for stepfathers. Mother's cohabitants rated themselves less warm toward their children than married biological fathers did; stepfathers also reported lower warmth scores, although the difference was not statistically significant. 115 Hofferth and Anderson concluded that, "consistent with evolutionary theory," biology affects a father's level of engagement. 116 They concluded further that "fathers will not invest as much cognitively or emotionally in nonbiological as in biological offspring." 117 They cite several reasons for this difference: 118 (1) that, particularly with regard to stepfathers, expectations are that they will be less involved with children, (2) that, particularly with regard to boyfriends, "parental" behavior toward their partner's child is "so new that norms have not developed to guide nonmarital partners in parenting children," 119 and (3) that men choosing to enter stepparent relationships may be positively or negatively selected depending on their motivation for becoming a de facto parent. 120 That is, Hofferth and Anderson suggest that nonbiological fathers make investments in children but they do so in part because it gains them favor with the child's mother, or "reproductive access." 121 Thus, the benefits gained by children living with nonbiological fathers may recede or disappear once the relationship between the child's mother and her partner ends. Therefore, Hofferth In sum, these studies suggest that biology produces real differences in investment and outcomes for children. Because the studies used different data sets and comparison groups to isolate the impact of biology, the differences they uncover are surely more than statistical blips. Certainly, selection effects may explain the results in any correlational study. 123 Nonetheless, these studies further an emerging literature on nonbiological caretakers that suggests that, as a group, the gains children realize from living with nongenetic caretakers may not be as great as we would otherwise suppose, and may represent only modest welfare increases over living alone with their mothers.
Some may see this decreased investment by nongenetic caretakers as irrelevant since only adults who meet the equal caretaking criterion qualify under the ALI's standard. Nonetheless, the drafters have not shown that performing equal caretaking functions during an intact relationship necessarily predicts the types of investments after break-up that warrant parental rights.
The differential investment by biological and nonbiological parents is important for another reason as well. The ALI assumes a child will be made better off by any time spent with the Ex Live-In Partner. Like the bundle of sticks that represents one's rights in property, such as the ability to exclude a person from private property, taking a stick from the legal parent's parenting bundle diminishes it. Here, giving time to an Ex Live-In Partner necessarily reduces the time that the biological mother can spend with the child. We should do this as a matter of policy only if we believe that the value of time spent with the Ex Live-In Partner exceeds the value of time spent with the child's mother, or if we believe that the child would get more out of that time if spent with the Ex Live-In Partner, or if spending time with an Ex Live-In Partner is costless and does not detract from the legal parent's time. It is far from clear that any of these assumptions are warranted.
More fundamentally, these studies examine children's welfare and the paternal investments that occur during the adults' intact relationship when, as many commentators have urged, "[i]nvestment in their partner's child may be an important relationship strategy for cohabiting men who wish to have their own children." 124 The ALI proposes to extend parental rights to these nonbiological fathers in the aftermath of failed relationships, a proposal that may actually produce seriously detrimental consequences for some children, as the next part explains.
III. Evidence of Negative Repercussions to Some Children
This part examines the impact of various features of de facto parents, as they are envisioned by the drafters, on a child's risk of physical abuse and sexual violence. It explains that a significant risk of sexual abuse arises in part when unrelated men, not present in a child's life from birth or shortly thereafter, have unsupervised access to a child without the moderating presence of the child's mother.
A. Risk of Sexual Victimization by Ex Live-In Partners
A child's exposure to unrelated men in her home plays a crucial role in determining her vulnerability to sexual victimization. Virtually every study of child sexual abuse reports that girls living with stepfathers are at high risk, 125 leading one researcher to conclude that the presence of a stepfather is "[t]he family feature whose risk has been most dramatically demonstrated."
126 While these studies differ in scope and the strength of their findings, they agree on one essential: the addition of an unrelated male "to a girl's family causes her vulnerability to skyrocket." 127 In one long-term study, researchers in New Zealand found that children reporting childhood sexual abuse were more likely to live with a stepparent before the age of fifteen.
128
Of those children experiencing intercourse, nearly half (45.4 percent) were raised in a stepparent household. 129 Final Report 5 at 6-5, 6-6 tbl.6-2 (1996) (reporting in a 1993 congressionallymandated study of 5,600 professionals in 842 agencies serving forty-two counties that one-fourth (25 percent) of sexually abused girls and boys were victimized by a parent substitute -defined to include in-home adoptive parents and stepparents, as well as parents' paramours). Moreover, as note 19 supra explains, the costs for boys of residing with unrelated males often takes the form of child homicide and punishing physical abuse and neglect. 126 women in San Francisco that one in six stepdaughters growing up with a stepfather was sexually abused, making these girls over seven times more likely to be sexually victimized than girls living with both biological parents. 130 Indeed, of forty risk factors tested for association with child sexual abuse in an early study, the presence of a stepfather "remained the strongest correlate of victimization, even when all other variables were statistically controlled."
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Stepfathers and mother's cohabitants also represent a greater proportion of abusers than their incidence in the general population, suggesting that they are more likely to abuse girls in their care than are biological fathers. In their study of children molested by caretakers, Leslie Margolin and John Craft posited that stepfathers should account for 10. cultures. 135 A study of child abuse registers in the United Kingdom found that 46 percent of paternal offenders were nonbirth fathers, compared to 54 percent who were birth fathers. 136 Given the fact that during the study time frame only 4 percent of British children resided with nonbirth fathers, father-substitutes appear "substantially over-represented" among perpetrators. 137 As one researcher concluded, "a stepfather was five times more likely to sexually victimize his stepdaughter than was a genetic father." 138 In more than one study, stepfathers actually outnumbered natural fathers as abusers, a telling result given the disproportionately greater number of biological fathers during the study time frames.
139 Christopher Bagley and Kathleen King estimate that "as many 135 (reviewing international studies of child sexual abuse and debunking the notion that "the problem is more severe in North America"). 136 Gordon & Creighton, supra note 135, at 99, 100, 101, 104 (reviewing data collected by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children). 137 Id. See also David Thorpe, Evaluating Child Protection 1, 84, 115 (1994) (finding in a study of social service referrals in the UK and western Australia that parents were responsible for 27.7 percent of the sexual abuse cases; in contrast, stepparents and de facto parents accounted for 24.8 percent of cases); Mrazek et al., supra note 135, at 150 (noting in a survey of 1,599 family doctors, police surgeons, pediatricians, and child psychiatrists in the UK that "[w]ithin the family, the natural father was most likely (48%) to be the perpetrator, with stepparents the next most common (28%)"); Susan J. Creighton & Neil Russell, Voices From Childhood: A Survey of Childhood Experiences and Attitudes to Child Rearing Among Adults in the United Kingdom 45 tbl.14 (1995) (reporting that 8 percent of respondents in England, Scotland, and Wales were sexually abused by their fathers, while 7 percent were victimized by a stepfather); Dobash et al, supra note 135, at 120 (finding in an analysis of 501 sexual abuse case files taken from Scottish police and child protection agencies that 23 percent of identified abusers were the child's natural father while 23 percent were the victim's stepfather or father substitute). 141 She used statistical tools to distinguish the effect of living without both natural parents from other aspects of household composition. 142 When all other variables were held constant, she found "children living with males in the household after separation [of their parents] were more than seven times more likely to be abused" than "children living with only females after separation." 143 In hard numbers, "over half of these children were sexually abused." 144 Bolen's findings suggest that the heightened risk to girls does not result from the breakup of a traditional nuclear family itself, 145 but "[i]nstead, living with a male in the household after separation . . . appeared to be the more important predictor."
146 As Bolen observes, "for children living with a male in the household, rates of abuse appeared to be better explained by (a) living with a stepfather or (b) being separated from one's natural mother."
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B. The Attractiveness of Single Mothers to Sex Offenders Who Target Children
That sex offenders might use adult relationships in order to gain access to child victims is firmly established. One sex offender's "guide" to molesting children begins with finding of abusers in the study were stepfathers, outnumbering natural father abusers, who constituted 28 percent of the abusers). 140 Christopher Bagley & Kathleen King, Child Sexual Abuse: The Search for Healing 75-6 (1990). The risk of abuse to girls from an Ex Live-In Partner is even greater than these comparisons suggest because these girls "are also more likely than other girls to be victimized by other men." Finkelhor, supra note 131, at 25. For example, stepdaughters are five times more likely to be abused by a friend of their parents than are girls in traditional nuclear families. Id. Thus, stepfathers "are associated with sexual victimization not just because they themselves take advantage of a girl, but because they increase the likelihood of a nonfamily member also doing so." Finkelhor, Sexually Victimized Children, supra note 127, at 130. See also Bagley & King, supra, at 91 (citing study finding that girls separated from one parent "were also at risk for sexual victimization by more than one adult"). Because the risk of sexual abuse is cumulative, one researcher found that " [v] irtually half the girls with stepfathers were victimized by someone." Finkelhor, supra note 131, at 25. 141 
See Rebecca M. Bolen, Predicting Risk to Be Sexually Abused: A Comparison of Logistic Regression to Event History
Analysis, 3 Child Maltreatment 157 (1998). 142 Id. (performing multivariate analyses of data from Diana Russell's survey of 933 adult women in the San Francisco area). 143 Id. 144 Id. at 163 (reporting that 53 percent were sexually abused). 145 Some may see the risks to children in fractured and blended families as a deficit of their family form (i.e., whether they have two parents). These statistics would not support such an inference -an intact family does not immunize a child from sexual exploitation. E.g., Finkelhor, supra note 126, at 68 ("[T]he presence of both natural parents is certainly not an indicator of low risk in any absolute sense."); P. 147 Id. at 166. While "the addition of a stepfather to a girl's family causes her vulnerability to skyrocket," Finkelhor, Sexually Victimized Children, supra note 127, at 122, it is overly simplistic to assume that the mother's remarriage or cohabitation is a necessary predicate to victimization. A girl's long-term separation from her father -a risk factor "strongly associated" with childhood victimization -is sometimes, but not always, followed by the introduction of unrelated males into the household. Bagley & King, supra note 140, at 91 (reporting results from several research studies).
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"some way to get a child living with you." 148 Anna Salter's interviews of sex offenders include a particularly chilling account by a sex offender who deliberately dated women in order to rape their children. 149 These men are not alone in taking this approach. Asked about their modus operandi in selecting victims, seventy-two incarcerated child molesters indicated they deliberately targeted "passive, quiet, troubled, lonely children from broken homes," since these characteristics indicate a child's vulnerability to the offender's advances. 150 As one child molester explains, by selecting a child "who doesn't have a happy home life," it is "easier to groom them and to gain their confidence." 151 This should come as no surprise. At least for those children who have experienced divorce, the emotional void created by the loss of a parent sometimes opens the child up to the abuser's predations, 152 making them less able to say "no" to unwanted sexual advances. 153 Offenders then simply exploit "a child's normal need to feel loved, valued and cared for." 154 Family fragmentation offers offenders a second advantage as well: it often isolates the child from social supports that existed before the divorce. 155 This heightened vulnerability may also stem, in part, from a lack of supervision, as single and separated parents navigate the taxing process of parenting alone and rebuilding their lives. 156 Many custodial and single mothers must work outside the home to support their family, diminishing the opportunity to supervise their children. 157 As Judith Wallerstein 
C. Risk of Sexual Abuse when a Child's Mother is Absent
The ALI's efforts to secure continuing contact between children and Ex Live-In Partners after the breakup of the adult relationship is problematic for other reasons, as well. These men will typically have access to the children outside the presence of their mothers. 159 The mere absence of a girl's mother heightens her risk for sexual exploitation. 160 For instance, researchers have compared girls who lived without their mother before the age of sixteen to those who remained with their mother throughout childhood. The sexual vulnerability of the estranged girls was nearly 200 percent greater than that of other girls, leading one researcher to conclude that "missing a mother is the most damaging kind of disruption." 161 This pattern of a girl's heightened vulnerability in mother-absent households is repeated in multiple studies. 162 In their investigation of father-daughter incest, Judith Herman and Lisa Hirschman found that risk of incest was particularly acute in families in which mothers were absent from the home due to hospitalization or other reasons. 163 Another study found that "[f]or women abused by someone outside of the family, the significant predictors [included] . . . mother's death[] and having an alcoholic mother." 164 The authors speculate that a mother's absence, in the form of her death or mental illness, "may place the child at risk of neglect that involves a lack of supervision." 165 In one of the few longitudinal studies 159 See Finkelhor, Sexually Victimized Children, supra note 127, at 124 (noting that for many mothers divorce necessitates working outside the home to support their families, diminishing the time and attention previously showered on their children); Wallerstein et al., supra note 6, at xxix (that the presence of a new man in a mother's life takes up time and energy previously shown to the children). 160 Most studies analyzing the "mother-absent" factor have examined situations in which the mother was absent for prolonged and sustained periods for time, due to health, mental illness, or death. The risk remains particularly acute in reconstituted families because the child's mother will be absent for certain periods of time and will rely on a nongenetic caretaker for supervision of the children, therefore magnifying the established baseline risk of having such an individual in the child's life by giving him access to that child outside her presence. 161 Finkelhor, Sexually Victimized Children, supra note 127, at 121. 162 See, e.g., Russell, supra note 72, at 363 (enumerating studies that have "shown that many mothers of incest victims are sick, absent, or in powerless or abusive situations themselves"); Alexander, supra note 127, at 185 (citing research documenting that maternal unavailability is among the "most significant predictors for increased risk for all kinds of sexual abuse"); Michael Gordon, The Family Environment of Sexual Abuse: A Comparison of Natal and Stepfather Abuse, 13 Child Abuse & Neglect 121, 128 (1989) (noting that "a girl whose mother is absent or passive is more vulnerable to abuse than a girl whose mother is present and active"); Mullen et al., supra note 145, at 18 (concluding that "having a close and confiding relationship with the mother seemed to confer a degree of protection"). 163 See Herman & Hirschman, supra note 125, at 968. Herman and Hirschman found that "[m]others in the incestuous families were more often described as ill or disabled and were more often absent for some period of time." Id. 168 Finkelhor et al., supra note 125, at 24 (finding in a national survey of 2626 adult men and women that separation from a natural parent for a major portion of one's childhood is a risk factor for sexual victimization). 169 E.g., De Francis, supra note 139, at 50 (finding in a study of 250 sexual abuse cases that in 60 percent of the families, the children's natural father or natural mother was not in the home -"an extraordinary high incidence of broken homes"); Russell, supra note 72, at 103, 104 tbl.8-1 (revealing that "women who were reared by both of their biological or adoptive parents were the least likely to be incestuously abused"); S. because the child returns home after visits with the de facto parent. In another sense, however, the mother is absent for those periods when the child is in the custody of the de facto parent, away from the mother's watchful, discerning eyes. There are good reasons, moreover, to avoid contexts that permit illicit desires to gain ground and manifest themselves. Many abused children never disclose the abuse; many outwardly display no telltale symptoms. 176 In fact, the abuse most likely to remain shrouded in secrecy often occurs at the hands of a father figure, 177 while violations by father figures are among the most depraved.
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D. Risks to Children Who Have Not Resided with an Adult from Infancy
Children also face a disproportionate risk from adults who have not resided with them from infancy, whether those adults have a biological connection to the child or not. Child abuse researchers have always been perplexed by runaway rates of incest in Navy families, an obvious conundrum for those who believe that a biological tether insulates a child from sexual exploitation. In a comparison of paternal caretaking among 118 incestuous fathers and 116 closely matched nonincestuous fathers, Williams and Finkelhor found that incestuous fathers were significantly less likely to have been in the home or involved in child-care activities during the child's first three years of life. 179 They concluded that involvement in non-bodily caretaking activities, like reading stories, during the first three to six years of a child's life serves to inhibit incest to the greatest degree. 180 While early care giving inhibits incest, it does not do so by inhibiting sexual arousal. 181 Rather, the inhibitory effect stems from the enhancement of parental impulses, developed when the child is very young, that allow the adult to view the child as his own. 182 Thus, the Residency Requirement may be protective if residency were required during a child's infancy but is not a be-all-and-end-all itself.
While high involvement in care giving during a child's early years is protective against incest, "being the sole care-giver for a daughter for at least 30 consecutive days was [also] found to increase the risk of later [father-daughter] incestuous abuse."
183 This is so because many incestuous fathers engage in high levels of caretaking as part of their efforts to "groom" the child. Intensive caretaking creates the conditions -time alone, unusual dependence, and the child's acceptance of intimate physical touch -that allow and encourage the child's tolerance of later sexual contact. 184 In many ways, the presence of caretaking among the most bonded parents, and the least -those who seek to exploit a child sexually -is a lot like the classic antitrust problem in which two gas stations operate directly across from each other, charging the same price for gasoline. The fact of an identical price is consistent with either collusion or perfect competition. 185 The problem is that price alone cannot tell us which of the two, collusion or competition, is operating. Likewise, the fact of caretaking does little to discern the adult's motivation and commitment to parenting. And unfortunately, the fate of a vulnerable child hangs in the balance.
Unlike many parents by estoppel, de facto parents do not believe that they were the child's biological father for a significant period of time after the child's birth. In the classic parent by estoppel case, the deceit serves the useful purpose of allowing the "parent" to bond with the child as if the child was his own biological child. Blossoming during this time are those mechanisms that dissuade most men from harming their "own."
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E. Continuing Contact Is Not an Unqualified Good to Children
Clearly, the risk factors for child sexual abuse are complex and interlinked. Despite this complexity, what we do know is that coresidence with an unrelated male and separation from one or both biological parents matter greatly to a child's risk of sexual abuse. We also know that the inability to bond with a child at birth, or shortly thereafter, elevates a child's later risk of incest with the biological father or father-substitute. Finally, a mother's protective presence mitigates this risk.
Under the Principles, not a single one of these mechanisms, which are known to protect a child from abuse, is necessarily present with de facto parents. An Ex Live-In Partner gains time with the child without the moderating presence of the child's mother; without the protection afforded by a biological or adoptive tie; without necessarily having bonded with the child at a young age; and without any guarantee that the adult is properly attached to the child and the child is attached to him. In short, the test for de facto parenthood brings none of these protective measures to bear on behalf of the children being laid claim to.
While the incest mechanism is complex and difficult to tease out, we do understand the long-term social, psychological, and economic effects of sexual abuse and exploitation to children. By advocating for rights that do not presently exist, the drafters are gambling with the lives of those children. The stakes are high. Sexual abuse at the hands of a parent 183 figure has devastating, corrosive effects on the child well into adulthood. 187 The harsh consequences to child victims counsel against expanding parental rights without additional safeguards.
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IV. The ALI's Test for De Facto Parents Does Not Separate the Good Risks from the Bad
Importantly, the test developed by the drafters to decide who counts as a de facto parent is poorly designed to exclude those individuals who pose the most significant risks. The very same conduct that would delight most women about their partner's interest in and interaction with her children, is also used to garner her trust and that of her child. Of the drafters' sixteen illustrative caretaking functions, eight overlap with and mirror those behaviors pedophiles engage in when "grooming" child victims, as Table 5 .1 demonstrates. Child molesters read to children, child molesters bathe children, child molesters dress children, child molesters discipline children, child molesters shower children with attention and gifts.
Clearly, we are looking for the wrong things here, at least if we are concerned about mitigating the possibility of this risk for children. Instead of looking for time-in-residence as a proxy for the bonded, dependent relationship, the Principles should look for that relationship itself. Admittedly, this inquiry would be less administrable, and involve greater cost, but it would more meaningfully respond to the risks this new entitlement poses for its intended beneficiaries.
Wisconsin allows a court to award visitation, but not custody, to individuals who formed "a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship[s] with [a] child." 189 In this formulation, what matters is whether the raison d'etre for awarding visitation is present: a bonded, dependent relationship that is parental in nature. Likewise, Oregon grants rights to "a person who establishes emotional ties creating child-parent relationship or ongoing personal relationship" with a child.
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V. Can the ALI's Test Be Refined to Minimize Harms while Preserving the Goods?
In any revised test for de facto parent, attachment should figure more prominently. If the child is improperly attached to the adult, then the benefits of continuing contact to the child will be small, and the risks will be high. Rather than using disproportionate attachment only as grounds for departure from the past caretaking standard, as the ALI does, attachment could be used to decide who has standing to seek time with the child after the adults' breakup. If used in this way, an Ex Live-In Partner would not have standing at all unless he was the psychological parent. This is the approach taken in V.C. v. M.J.B, in which the court concluded that the psychological parent of the child had standing to proceed in a custody case. 191 The psychological parent-child bond arguably is a more effective sorting mechanism than time in residence as an equal caretaker. Including a "psychological parent" requirement would remove many men who pose risks, while perhaps allowing continuing contact only with those men with whom a child would benefit, on balance. However states choose to define de facto parents, it should "surely be limited to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child's life." 192 These are the relationships that should be preserved and continued.
Alternatively, the Principles could give courts the discretion to allow nonparents to go forward when they deem it is in the best interests of the child, as occurs with 193 At least this would be an individual-specific inquiry, rather than the conferral of possible rights wholesale on Ex Live-In Partners. Or, like the drafters' treatment of intervention by third parties in Section 2.04(2), de facto parents could be given the ability to intervene in pending actions, but not the right to initiate actions unilaterally.
The ALI's proposal raises not just a question of who counts. It also raises questions about what they should receive. The ALI's proposal ratchets up the "rights" of de facto parents, via the past caretaking standard, entitling them to as much as an equal share of custody since they performed equal caretaking. While a real 50/50 split is impracticable, the use of the past caretaking standard would permit courts to award Ex Live-In Partners much more unsupervised time than de facto parents presently receive in most states.
Obviously, one problem with any approach is underinclusiveness: removing too many good men from the tent of "de facto parenthood." Yet even these good men would have some recourse -they could file a complaint for custody under the traditional third-party custody standard, which generally requires exceptional circumstances or unfitness of the legal parent. 194 Or they could secure a voluntary agreement after the breakup with the legal parent. 195 With the latter, of course, the question becomes how many good men will be unable to secure an agreement with the child's mother. If the relationship between the child and the mother's ex-partner is good for the child, we can expect lots of mothers will want to preserve that relationship.
It is certainly true that many of the de facto parent cases are very sympathetic and raise claims that require a response, both out of fairness to the adult and out of concern for the child -for instance, those cases in which the de facto parent survives the child's legal parent and is willing to continue caring for a child after the death but is challenged in this by a biological father who has been largely absent or by a more distant relative. In this instance, a continuing relationship with the de facto parent may shield the child from even greater dislocation following the parent's death and may be a source of comfort and continuity. Moreover, the de facto parent and mother may have had a biological child in common, so that removing the mother's child from the de facto parent's care jeopardizes that child's relationship with his or her siblings. Indeed, the de facto parent may well represent the best adult available to care for this child. Preserving this relationship is very different, however, from providing continuing contact with a mother's ex-partner outside her supervision and over her veto, while carving into the time that she spends with the child. States are always free to address the claims of adults in only the most compelling cases, without diluting the value of these reforms by reaching cases in which it is far less clear how children will fare.
VI. Conclusion
By sleight of hand, designating more and more adults as "parents" to whom custodial responsibility may be given, the ALI glosses over significant differences in the protective capacities of legal parents and other caretakers -as well as their desires to exploit children. 193 See Principles § 2.04, Reporter's Notes, cmt. g, at 142 (noting that courts in some states "have considerable discretion to allow nonparents to intervene in custody disputes"); Id. § 2.04 cmt. a, at 135 (allowing individuals to intervene whose participation, the court finds, "is likely to serve the child's best interests"). 194 See generally Murphy, supra note 61. 195 Principles § 2.05 cmt. f, at 150 (noting that separating adults are "free to settle any issues they wish on their own").
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